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he relationship between fiscal decentralisation
(FD) and economic growth has been analysed
by a number of economists during the last three
decades. Linking economic growth and FD togeth-
er has mainly three reasons: firstly, growth is seen
as an objective of FD and efficiency in the alloca-
tion of resources in the public sector; secondly, it is
an explicit intention of governments to adopt poli-
cies that lead to a sustained increase in per capita
income and thirdly, per capita growth is easier to
measure and to interpret than other economic per-
formance indicators. While theoretical examina-
tions started with the pioneer publications of
Tiebout (1956),Musgrave (1959) and Oates (1972),
empirical analysis regarding the role of economic
growth on FD started at the end of the 1970s and
estimations concerning the direct impact of FD on
economic growth have only been conducted since
the end of the 1990s. Both theoretical and empiri-
cal analyses tend to be inconclusive and come up
with ambiguous and differing results. One can con-
clude that this is the outcome of the theoretical
trade-off construction, which reflects the various
pros and cons of a decentralised government struc-
ture. But we shall also consider that direct empiri-
cal estimations are still scarce and do not suffi-
ciently involve new results of economic growth
theory and empiricism. In addition, different
methodological approaches and diverse designs for
decentralisation have been applied. Furthermore,
theoretical foundations for the direct impact of FD
on economic growth have remained largely unde-
veloped and have therefore weakened the validity
of the empirical work on this topic (see Martinez-
Vazquez and McNab 2001).Nevertheless,the empir-
ical studies on the direct impact of FD on economic
growth during the last decade have not only provid-
ed the first corresponding empirical examinations,
but have also elaborated meaningful insights into
various aspects of this relationship. Therefore, it is
time for an evaluation (again)1. This article reviews
these studies, summarises their major findings,
examines the covered time horizon and region,com-
pares the applied theoretical framework and the
chosen empirical methodology,evaluates the chosen
indicators for fiscal decentralisation and the specifi-
cation of the dependent growth variable.In this way
we would like to acknowledge this scientific focus of
the last decade and contribute to a better under-
standing of the “real” linkage between the two vari-
ables of interest.
Survey of the status quo of empirical evidence
Data coverage
Since 1995 there have been few empirical studies,
which have directly examined the impact of fiscal
decentralisation on economic growth (in total
14 studies). This survey concentrates on cross-
country studies and on studies on particular (fed-
eral) states, while studies on developing or transi-
tional countries or studies, which concentrate on
the effects of centralisation instead of decentralisa-
tion, are tackled only secondarily. Currently there
are only six cross-country studies2 and several ones
on particular countries.3 Within the cross-country
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1 In January 2001, Martinez-Vazquez and McNab composed a first
survey regarding this issue. Nevertheless, they did not take into
account several studies published before this date: Oates (1995),
Thießen (2000), or Yilmaz (2000). Until today, a number of new
studies have been conducted.
2 Oates 1995; Davoodi and Zou 1998 (mixed set of developing
countries and OECD countries); Woller and Phillips 1998 (set of
least developed countries [LDCs]);Yilmaz 1999;Thießen 2000 and
Thießen 2003 (high income OECD countries).
3 Three on China (Zhang and Zou 1998;Lin and Liu 2000;Zhang and
Zou 2001), two on the United States (Xie, Zou and Davoodi 1999;
Akai, Nishimura and Sakata 2002 and 2004), one on Germany
(Behnisch, Buettner and Stegarescu 2001), one on India (Zhang and
Zou 2001),and one on Russia (Desai,Freinkman and Goldberg 2003).studies, the countries are grouped into high and
low income ones (see Thießen 2000 and 2003), into
unitary and federal ones (in order to consider the
diverse constitutional structures, see Yilmaz 1999;
see also Figure 1), or into different geographical
areas (see Akai and Sakata 2002). They also con-
sider the size of the jurisdictions in order to make
the ratios more comparable across states and
launch size variables (see Zhang and Zou 2001:
area of Indian states; Desai et al. 2003: size of
regional Russian population) or include per capita
explanatory variables.
Following Yilmaz (1999), we have depicted
Figure 1, where the relationship between the
decentralisation of government expenditures
and the constitutional structure of selected
countries is shown.We use the “index of federal-
ism” of Lijphart (1999), which is rated on a five-
point scale: unitary and centralised (1), unitary
but decentralised (2), semi-federal (3), federal
but centralised (4), federal and decentralised (5).
It is highly plausible that the different degrees
of decentralisation can be partly explained by
the constitutional structure of competence allo-
cation. But, as the definition of the federalism
index demonstrates, federalism and decentralisa-
tion need not necessarily be the same. For exam-
ple, the unitary Scandinavian countries show
quite high degrees of expenditure decentralisa-
tion, while Belgium as a semi-federal country
exhibits a relatively low decentralisation ratio.
Thus, the right to decide (constitutional determi-
nation of the allocation of competences to differ-
ent levels of government) and the right to act
(effective decentralisation of expenditures)
might differ.
Chosen variables
Most authors choose the budget
data approach and approximate the
degree of FD using the share of
sub-national government expendi-
tures (or revenues) in general gov-
ernment expenditures (or rev-
enues), net of intergovernmental
transfers.The Government Finance
Statistics (GFS) of the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF)
operate as the corresponding data-
base. As the GFS have been deliv-
ering data since the early 1970s, the
resulting time series have a length
of circa 30 years. While the revenue share is cho-
sen only in three studies (see Woller and Phillips
1998, Thießen 2003 and Akai et al. 2004), the
expenditure share is built into eight examinations.
Zhang and Zou (1998 and 2001) examine the
cross-provincial impact of FD in China and in
India and use the ratio of consolidated provincial
budgetary spending (revenue) to central bud-
getary spending (revenue). Lin and Liu (2000)
and Desai et al. (2003) use the marginal revenue
retention rate or tax revenue retention rate,
respectively, as a measure for FD in order to con-
sider regional fiscal incentives and regional fiscal
autonomy. A similar measure for the indepen-
dence of sub-national levels is the self-reliance
ratio (share of own revenues of lower levels in
their total revenues), which is used by Oates
(1995) and Thießen (2000 and 2003).
These indicators for FD are disaggregated by func-
tion at different levels of government. Davoodi and
Zou (1998) discuss the opposing expected effects of
capital and infrastructure expenditures (positive
growth effects) versus current and welfare expendi-
tures (negative growth effects). In order to consider
the accurate responsibility of either level of govern-
ment,Woller and Phillips (1998) construct an expen-
diture share subtracting defence and social security
spending and a revenue share subtracting grants-in-
aid. Behnisch et al. (2001) analyse different spend-
ing categories (education and science, transport and
communication) at the central level.Zhang and Zou
(1998 and 2001) show the most sophisticated
approach respecting functional diversification and
differentiate between budgetary and extra-bud-
getary spending and different spending categories
at the central and provincial level.
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With respect to the dependent variable, the
majority of the studies use the growth rate of real
GDP per capita (in cross-country studies) or the
growth rate of real provincial (state) income (in
studies on particular countries). Exceptions are
Behnisch et al. (2001), who analyse the impact of
public sector centralisation on total factor pro-
ductivity growth (TFPG),Desai et al.(2003),who
use a recovery index focused on regional in-
dustrial output, or Akai et al. (2004), who test
the impact of FD on economic volatility. Thie-
ßen (2000) decomposes economic growth into
its components TFPG and the growth rate of
real gross fixed capital formation and estimates
own regressions using these rates as dependent
variables.
Conceptual framework
Most authors use the endogenous growth model of
Barro (1990), where the production function has
multiple inputs including private capital and public
spending.They split public spending into three lev-
els of government (for the first time in Davoodi
and Zou 1998) and analyse different decentralisa-
tion shares regarding their consistency with growth
maximisation (see in particular Xie et al. 1999).
Highest complexity is reached in Zhang and Zou
(2001), who augment the aforementioned
approach and develop a model that links multiple
sectors of public spending by multiple levels of
government to economic growth.Akai et al. (2004)
refer additionally to Nishimura (2001), who devel-
oped a model that considers differences in the
quality as well as complementarities of public ser-
vices. Lin and Liu (2000) and Thießen (2003)
choose a different approach. They follow Mankiw,
Romer and Weil (1992) and adapt their augmented
Solow model of economic growth introducing FD
as explanatory variable.
Empirical methodology
Two kinds of conventional growth regressions are
employed:pure cross-country regressions and panel
data regressions based on several period averages.
In panels usually annual frequency data are used,
but it is also possible to construct perennial aver-
age panels in order to capture the likelihood of
long-run effects (see Davoodi and Zou 1998;
Woller and Phillips 1998). Pros and cons of these
two regression types are discussed in particular by
Thießen (2000 and 2003), who finally gives priority
to pure cross-sectional growth regressions based
on averages of annual data. The differences
between the two approaches are pronounced in his
first study, where the estimated pure cross-section
regression shows that FD affects GDP growth pos-
itively (the coefficient for Western European coun-
tries is not significant). Adding the time series
dimension and estimating the panel regressions,
the significance of the FD indicator disappears
completely and the coefficient for European coun-
tries becomes even negative. However, most
authors choose the panel data method and include
country fixed and time fixed effects in order to con-
trol for individual-specific, time invariant charac-
teristics of the analysed countries. Besides panel
and pure cross-section regressions the growth
accounting procedure is employed (see Thießen
2000; Behnisch et al. 2001). Ordinary least squares
(OLS) estimation predominates the studies, while
general least squares (GLS) (see Zhang and Zou
1998;Thießen 2000), least squares dummy variable
(LSDV; see Zhang and Zou 1998), or maximum
likelihood (ML) estimation (see Akai and Sakata
2002) are applied only in particular cases. In addi-
tion, Desai et al. (2003) estimate simultaneous
growth regressions and use three stage least
squares (3SLS) estimators in order to correct for
simultaneity and the potential endogeneity of cer-
tain explanatory variables (i.e.,budgetary transfers
from the central level as percentage of regional
governmental revenue).
Within empirical estimation most authors conduct
sensitivity analyses following Levine and Renelt
(1992).Accordingly they distinguish between three
groups of explanatory variables: base regressors,
which are always included in the regressions; the
variables of interest (i.e., fiscal decentralisation);
and a subset of regressors chosen from a pool of
variables identified by past studies as potentially
important explanatory variables for growth. In
addition, they classify a variable as “robust”, “if it
remains statistically significant and of the theoret-
ically predicted sign when the conditioning set of
variables in the regression changes” (Levine and
Renelt 1992, 943). Only Woller and Phillips (1998)
pick up the critique of Sala-i-Martin (1997) regard-
ing the Levine-Renelt (1992) procedure (“the test
is too strong for any variable to pass it”, Sala-i-
Martin 1997, 179) and conduct additional robust-
ness tests following his improvement advice, based
mainly on the kind of the cumulative distribution
of the estimates.Major findings
While theory indicates a positive impact of FD on
economic growth due to efficiency gains,the empir-
ical verifications are only in part able to support
this hypothesis. Oates (1995) detects a significant
and robust positive correlation between FD and
growth.The self-reliance variable is not statistical-
ly significant, but its first difference is. Lin and Liu
(2000) show that China’s overall growth rate
depends positively on FD – mainly via efficiency
improvements of resource allocation rather than
via inducing more investment. Yilmaz (1999) finds
for unitary countries a significant positive impact
of FD on per capita growth while his results for
federal countries are inconclusive. Desai et al.
(2003) conclude that tax retention as a proxy for
fiscal autonomy has shown a significant positive
effect on industrial output recovery of the Russian
regions since the break-up of the Soviet Union.
The strongest effects can be observed in regions
with limited opportunities for rent-seeking.Akai et
al. (2004) demonstrate that FD affects economic
growth of the US states positively and economic
volatility negatively – thus, FD is conducive for
providing a stable economic growth. Zhang and
Zou (2001) detect a positive effect of the per capi-
ta FD shares on Indian regional economic growth,
albeit the effect is only significant in the case of the
per capita revenue share.The shares of central gov-
ernment budgetary spending on development as
well as on social and community services show a
significant positive impact on growth.
A significant and robust negative impact of FD on
China’s provincial economic growth is revealed by
Zhang and Zou (1998 and 2001). Key infrastructure
projects with nation-wide externalities,which are too
decentralised in China, are the main reason for this
result.Comparing this study with Lin and Liu (2000)
it becomes clear that, interestingly, FD induces
diverse growth performances at the national and at
the provincial level.Davoodi and Zou (1998) find for
the developing countries also a negative effect of FD
on growth, albeit not significant, and for the devel-
oped countries no clear relationship. When the
whole sample is used, this negative effect of FD on
growth seems to be more significant. Excessive
spending of sub-national governments on wrong
expenditure items is stated as a reason. Woller and
Phillips (1998) concur with Davoodi and Zou (1998)
in finding no significant and robust relationship in
LDCs. At best, they are able to detect a weak
inverse relationship between the revenue share
and growth. Xie et al. (1999) find for the US states
also insignificant coefficients on local and state
spending shares, but they argue, referring to their
adopted theoretical model, that insignificant FD
shares indicate consistency with growth maximisa-
tion. However, the model could even be wrong and
insignificance could also indicate that FD is irrele-
vant to growth and should have no effect.
Observing the impact on growth from the opposite
point of view – namely from the centralisation per-
spective – the results are still mixed. On the one
hand, Behnisch et al. (2001) identify in Germany a
statistically significant positive effect of overall
centralisation on TFPG, but not for total public
expenditures (insignificant, negative sign), central
expenditures on education and science (weakly
significant, negative sign) and central expenditures
on transport and communication (insignificant,
positive sign). They argue that co-ordination of
policies among lower level jurisdictions is less effi-
cient and overall central government intervention
is still needed. On the other hand, Schneider and
Wagner (2000) find that centralised wage bargain-
ing shows a significant negative impact on long-run
economic growth in the European Union, mainly
because of transaction and free-rider costs.
Thießen (2000 and 2003) chooses a somewhat
alternative approach. He tests the hypothesis of a
hump-shaped relationship between FD and eco-
nomic growth. In the case of too much decentrali-
sation, inter-jurisdictional externalities cannot be
internalised and economies of scale are not
realised; negative growth effects are the conse-
quence. The same holds for a low level of decen-
tralisation:unconsidered preferences lead to ineffi-
ciencies in the provision of public goods, what
inhibits, in turn, economic growth (see Breuss and
Eller 2004). This theoretical trade-off construction
indicates that the optimal degree of FD lies some-
where in between an extremely high and an
extremely low one. Thießen (2000) finds that the
hump-shaped relationship is particularly pro-
nounced in the countries with highest per capita
income4 while there is evidence that low per capita
income countries grow linearly with higher decen-
tralisation degrees.5 Figure 2 relates the degree of
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expenditure decentralisation to the economic
growth rate of 25 OECD countries.With the excep-
tion of a few outliers (Ireland, Luxembourg, New
Zealand, and Mexico), the hump-shaped relation-
ship is convincingly confirmed by descriptive data.
In addition,Thießen (2003) tests the convergence of
the FD shares towards a medium degree implement-
ing three dummy variables, which represent a low,
medium and high degree of FD.Within the sample of
21 OECD countries the low and high degree are sig-
nificant at the ten percent level, while the medium
degree is significant at the five-percent level. The
medium degree is associated with higher long-run
per-worker growth than either a low or high degree.
In this way, the observed trend of convergence
among high-income OECD countries towards a
medium degree of FD tends to promote economic
growth (see Thießen 2003).Akai et al. (2004) classi-
fy their data set for FD variables also into high,
medium and low degrees of FD in order to test the
robustness of their estimations. All coefficients of
the classified expenditure shares are highly signifi-
cant at the one-percent level and show positive signs.
Thus, FD is conducive to growth regardless of the
current degree of decentralisation. Interestingly, the
group with a low degree of FD shows the highest
coefficient, indicating that US states with a low
degree of FD tend to grow stronger.
Critical appraisal and future research
necessities
Despite the intense theoretical and political debate
of the pros and cons of FD, systematic evidence of
the impact of FD on economic
growth is still scarce. Ambi-
valent effects are at work; clear
recommendations regarding
the optimal degree of decen-
tralisation are difficult to draw.
This survey showed that there
is no unambiguous, automatic,
relationship between decentral-
isation and growth. Martinez-
Vazquez and McNab (2001)
reviewed six empirical studies
estimating the direct impact of
FD on growth. Our survey is
enriched by eight additional
studies.Despite meaningful vari-
ations and differentiation within
the budget data dimension (e.g.,
diversification by governmental function and level,
consideration of size variables and constitutional
structure, or examination of the hump-shaped and
convergence hypothesis), several deficiencies of the
respective estimations stated in Martinez-Vazquez
and McNab (2001) have been removed only mar-
ginally.
(a) There is still a problem of possible misspecifica-
tion of the empirical estimation models. Since
most authors apply the Levine-Renelt (1992)
procedure and exclude some of the necessary
control variables, an omitted variable bias may
be the consequence. As Sala-i-Martin (1997,
180) emphasises, “missing important variables
is more of a problem than introducing irrele-
vant variables”.
(b)The  measurement of FD is still problematic
because of the omnipresent budget data
approach, which is only in part able to account
for the various dimensions of FD. The World
Bank evaluates the application of the GFS on
decentralisation issues and highlights various
shortcomings, ranging from the lack of details
on expenditure autonomy and own-source rev-
enue to deficiencies regarding reported data for
the sub-national levels and information scarcity
for analysing dispersion among sub-national
regions (see http://www1.worldbank.org/ public-
sector/ decentralization). In order to cope with
multi-level governments and with the multidi-
mensionality of FD, the exploration of new
approaches plays a crucial role (see also Ebel
and Yilmaz 2002, 17). It is time for a new gen-
eration of decentralisation variables. It is nec-
Figure 2essary to examine reliable and comparable
indicators for federal autonomies. In this con-
nection the attempts of the OECD (“Survey on
Fiscal Design Across Levels of Government”,
with data for sub-national fiscal autonomy in
Central and Eastern Europe), the World Bank
(“Fiscal Decentralization Indicators Project”),
or Treisman (2000; distinguishes five types of
decentralisation: structural, decision, resource,
electoral, and institutional decentralisation)
have to be strongly supported.
(c) The different channels of interference and
potential bi-directional causalities between FD
and economic growth have not been sufficient-
ly considered within theoretical models or
empirical specifications, respectively. If decen-
tralisation is seen as a superior good (due to
possible quality gains in the supply of public
goods) and shows therefore a higher income
elasticity, then a higher income per capita can
form the basis for additional expenditures used
for the constitution of a new decentralised
level. In this case per capita income is expected
to have a positive effect on FD.6 Since several
studies showed that FD depends on the level of
economic development, generally measured by
per capita income (for a recent study see
Letelier 2003), the problem of endogeneity and
spurious correlation arises when FD is put as
an explanatory variable into an economic
growth regression.
Therefore, future research should intensify, firstly,
the efforts to formalise the primary impact of FD
on allocative efficiency, redistribution and macro-
economic stability.Then the linkage between these
three branches and economic growth should be
constructed. In this way the indirect impact of FD
on growth can be considered. Secondly, given
potential bi-directional causalities it is also neces-
sary to address the present research regarding the
impact of economic growth on FD and examine the
various channels of interference. Thirdly, it is
important to specify precisely the determinants
and dimensions of both FD and economic growth
and clarify which exogenous variables determine
simultaneously the two variables of interest (as,
e.g., population growth). Implementing these three
fundamental components into a theoretical model
will provide a basis for new, more sophisticated
empirical verifications. These, in turn, are not only
led by the latest estimation procedures of econom-
ic growth empiricism (in order to overcome the
problem of empirical misspecification) but resort
also to a new generation of decentralisation data
(in order to overcome the problem of data inaccu-
racy). In this way more satisfactory outcomes
should be expected.
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